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1. INTRODUCTION 
Tactical computing involves the processing of sensor data to produce timely 
information for warfighters to use in making effective decisions, and the accurate and 
timely dissemination of orders (including weapons control data) to various units and 
systems during an engagement.  With the advent of net-centric warfare, which first 
appeared publicly in the article by Cebrowski and Garstka in 1998 [1] and was further 
refined in the articles by Alberts et al. [2, 3], tactical computing now includes all 
computations necessary to provide shared situational awareness among geographically 
dispersed forces in a digitally connected battlespace. To accomplish the ultimate goal of 
net-centric warfare, we need a globally distributed system-of-systems that allows the 
“edge-entities” who are conducting military missions to “smart-pull” information from 
ubiquitous sources at anytime and from anywhere.  Cloud computing, which builds on 
grid computing, service-oriented computing, and virtualization technologies, is an enabler 
for building such globally distributed system-of-systems.  While cloud computing holds 
promise to help improve workflows and efficiency in the military strategic, operational 
and tactical level defense processes, the tactical environment’s special limitations and 
constraints pose some especially challenging engineering problems to be solved.   
In FY2010, we identified some of the technical enablers for applying cloud 
computing in tactical systems. We developed high-level generic use cases to understand 
how cloud computing can play a role in supporting changes in the workflows employed 
by warfighters to attain information superiority [4].  From those use cases, we identified 
the following topical areas as being of high priority for further investigation: (i) 
interoperability among hybrid clouds, (ii) timeliness of data, computation, and 
communication, (iii) system safety, (iv) system security, (v) continuity of operations, (vi) 
dynamic reconfiguration, and (vii) phased migration.  We also identified trustworthy and 
robust tactical communications as an essential enabler for the optimum use of cloud 
techniques to distribute data and processing over the tactical environment.   
This report summarizes the research conducted in FY11. We focus on the 
potential benefits of cloud computing on tactical communications, which involves the 
transmission of both voice and digital data via multiple waveforms (e.g., cellular and RF) 
over a wide spectrum of radio frequencies (i.e., from RF to SHF).   
 
2.  SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT 
In [5], Dixon identifies opportunities for leveraging commercial cellular 
technology in military communications systems by integrating a variety of wireless 
technologies without compromising security and reliability.  The US Department of 
Defense (DoD) is experimenting with the hybrid mobile devices that accommodate both 
tactical radio and cellular waveforms.  In this report we present our vision of using the 
cloud to ubiquitously supply services to the tactical edge.  
Spectrum management involves optimizing the use of the different waveforms 
and frequencies to maximize mission effectiveness while minimizing interference.  The 
Spectrum-Management system is a distributed system designed to coordinate and manage 
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the use of frequencies and waveforms to maximize communication between mobile 
devices (e.g., tactical radios, smartphones, tablet computers) and access points of the 
tactical cloud.  It consists of a set of regional spectrum-management services.  Each 
regional spectrum-management service is a Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) and is 
accessible from mobile devices and the regional tactical communication providers via the 
tactical cloud access points in the corresponding communication region.  The 
communication regions may overlap, in which case these regional spectrum-management 
services collaborate with each other to manage the overlapped areas. 
The following subsections contain two use cases highlighting the intended use of 
the spectrum-management services. 
 
2.1  Use Case 1 – Spectrum Selection 
Actors:  User, Regional Spectrum-Management Service 
Description:  This use case describes the process for the applications on a user’s mobile 
device to acquire frequency and waveform allocations from the regional spectrum-
management service. 
Main Scenario: 
(1) User activates a tactical cloud-based application function that, in its operation, 
will require spectrum use. 
(2) The tactical cloud-based application informs the Spectrum Manager (SM) 
application on the mobile device (MD) of the necessary communications 
requirements (e.g., in terms of bandwidth, security level, and media types). 
(3) The SM application on the MD authenticates itself to the Regional Spectrum-
Management cloud service and the Regional Spectrum-Management Service 
authenticates itself to the SM application on the device and the two establish a 
secure (encrypted) channel that provides data-integrity checks, all done over the 
default frequency and waveform.  All further communications that use the default 
frequency and waveform take place over a secure channel.1 
(4) The SM application on the mobile device negotiates with the Regional Spectrum-
Management Service via the default frequency and waveform on behalf of the 
tactical cloud-based application for allocation of spectrum assets. 
(5) The Regional Spectrum-Management Service replies with the recommended 
frequency and waveform, together with alternate frequencies and waveforms.  
(6) The SM application informs the tactical cloud-based application on the MD of the 
available frequency and waveform allocations.  
(7) The tactical cloud-based application uses the information provided by the SM to 
inform the user of the MD of the application quality-of-service (QoS) the tactical 
                                                 
1 Note that if this is not done, then an adversary could potentially become a “man-in-the-middle” 
and/or manipulate the assignment of resources to its advantage.  
 3 
cloud-based application will be able to provide based upon the actual frequency 
and waveform availability. 
(8) Advanced users can be presented the opportunity to manually update the spectrum 
requests  (e.g., in terms of bandwidth, security level, and media types).2 This will 
result in reentering Step 3 to perform additional spectrum-negotiation. 
(9) The user accepts the tactical cloud-based application QoS and executes the 
intended application functionality.  The MD uses the negotiated frequency and 
waveform allocations and opens a communication session. 
Exceptions: 
(3a) If default frequency not available, the SM notifies the user of the MD and 
initiates a search for available frequencies and waveforms. 
 
2.2 Use Case 2 – Spectrum Management 
Actors: Regional Spectrum-Management Service, Regional Tactical Communication 
Provider, User 
Description:  This use case describes the process for the Regional Spectrum-
Management Service to coordinate and manage the use of frequencies and waveforms to 
maximize communication between the mobile devices and the access points of the 
tactical cloud. 
Main Scenario: 
(1) The Regional Tactical Communication Providers (RTCP) inform the Regional-
Spectrum-Management Service about the health status and current/scheduled 
usage of available frequencies and waveforms. 
(2) The Regional Spectrum-Management Service updates its regional tactical 
communication common operating picture (RTC COP). 
(3) A SM application on the user’s MD provides the Regional Spectrum-Management 
Service with communication requirements. 
(4) The Regional Spectrum-Management Service cross references the request with its 
RTC COP, returns the frequency and waveform allocation to the MD, and updates 
its RTC COP. 
(5) The user’s MD initiates the communication session via the use of the tactical 
cloud-based application. 
(6) The User, the tactical cloud-based application, and the SM of the MD monitor the 
communication session to ensure that the negotiated QoS is maintained. In the 
event of service degradation (e.g., due to traffic congestion or poor reception), the 
                                                 
2 Advanced users here means users that have an appropriate level of training to perform such actions, 
such a Navy Information Systems Technician or Army Signal Corps Signal Support Systems Specialist or 
Telecommunications Systems Engineer. 
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SM and the Regional Spectrum-Management Service negotiate new allocations of 
frequencies and waveforms and the Regional Spectrum-Management Service 
updates the RTC COP. 
(7) The RTCP notifies the Regional Spectrum-Management Service about problems 
with any of the managed frequencies and waveforms. The Regional Spectrum-
Management Service updates the RTC COP and then sends updated frequency 
and waveform allocations to the applicable participants in communication session. 
(8) The User terminates a communication session via the tactical cloud-based 
application, completing the task that required communication. Upon task 
completion, the tactical cloud-based application notifies the MD’s SM 
application, which in turn notifies the Spectrum-Management Service that the MD 
is relinquishing its frequency and waveform allocation.  The Spectrum-
Management Service updates its RTC COP. 
 
3.  VERIFICATION & VALIDATION CONSIDERATIONS 
The Spectrum-Management system is a heterogeneous distributed system with the 
following agents: 
(1) Tactical communication provider (plurality)3 
(2) SM (singleton per-user device) 
(3) Regional Spectrum-Management Service SaaS (plurality) 
(4) User device (plurality) 
 
3.1 The Verification of Distributed Systems - An Overview 
Distributed systems are notoriously hard to verify. While classical, academic 
techniques such as Theorem Proving (TP) and Model Checking (MC) can be used to 
verify rather simple correctness properties (assertions) with respect to small parts of the 
system, or to a highly abstracted model of the system, Runtime Verification (RV) 
remains the preferred method for verifying a large, distributed, (soft) real-time system. 
See [6] for further details. 
RV is a hybrid of formal specification (e.g., using UML statechart assertions) and 
conventional testing, where the actual behavior of the System Under Test (SUT) is 
compared automatically with its expected behavior as specified by the assertions. This is 
done by executing an implementation version of the formal specification assertions in 
tandem with the SUT (i.e., on-line RV), or by executing the assertions against a recorded 
trace of the SUT’s execution (i.e., off-line, perhaps remote, RV). 
Verification of distributed systems is notoriously difficult because of the 
following aspects: 
                                                 
3 There will be places on the Earth where communications providers overlap. Depending on who 
“owns” various satellite channels this may be almost everywhere. 
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(1) Complexity. A distributed systems’ state space is extremely large (being a 
Cartesian product of the state space of its constituent systems).  Consequently, 
it is difficult to cover the state space in a trustworthy way during testing.  
(2) Timing. Constituent systems within a distributed system do not, for the most 
part, share a common clock. Consequently, temporal assertions that assert 
about timing of more than a single sub-system are difficult to verify. 
(3) Contractual issues. By contract it is meant the “promise” a component or sub-
systems makes with respect to its interface, namely, the manner in which it 
will respond given certain input sequences received via its interface, and the 
constraints it is expecting those inputs to conform to. Distributed systems 
often fail to formally specify contracts, rendering verification all but 
impossible. 
(4) Accurate representation.  Fielded distributed systems do not behave like their 
lab, or development version counter parts. This is because of the dynamic 
aspect of the system, and the fact that the composite behavior of a fielded 
distributed system tends to be different than its lab version. 
 
3.2 Suggested Verification Strategy for SM 
We suggested a contract-based and prototype-based RV approach for the 
verification of the Spectrum-Management system. The proposed contract based RV 
requires four sets of requirements: 
(1) Interface requirements.  This is a well-defined set of contracts specifying the 
inter-component communication format and behavior. For example, consider 
the interface requirement for a Regional Spectrum-Management Service 
component, per Step 4 of UC1: data packages received from SM via default 
frequency and waveform may not exceed 1K bytes in length and will be 
received at most one packet per 100ms interval. 
(2) Sub-system requirements. Each is a set of requirements for the particular sub-
system.  
(3) Plurality requirements. A (rather limited) set of requirements discussing 
aspects of the system that deal with the existence of a plurality of subsystems, 
such as “If a user send communication requirements to Regional Spectrum-
Management Service A, it may not, within a 15 second interval, send 
communication requirements to Regional Spectrum-Management Service B”. 
Sub-system requirements are verified in a two-step process: 
(1) Sub-system verification. Here, each subsystem is verified on a standalone 
basis.  
(2) System level verification, which consists of the verification of interface and 
plurality requirements.  This step requires an executable model or platform, on 
which the model of the distributed system is verified using RV. The proposed 
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approach is to rapidly develop a model of the distributed system, abstracted so 
it models the interface contracts (using sub-system requirements, that is, 
assuming the sub-systems had already been verified in Step 1).   
We have rapidly developed a similar a prototype in the past, as a proof-of-concept 
demonstration, using the Eclipse/OSGi framework (http://eclipse.org/osgi/). 
 
4. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS 
We can view the system under consideration as a resource management system.  
There are a number of application layer security concerns (e.g., application requirements 
for “quality of security service”) that will not be directly represented by the security 
discussion below. 
The correct operation of the system depends on the availability of a 
frequency/waveform for communication for use when requested. In addition, the fact that 
a set of waveforms and frequencies may be used or that a particular set of frequencies is 
in use shall not be available to unauthorized parties.  As a result one could have the 
following security objectives: 
(1) Only authorized equipment will be allowed to connect to the system, make 
requests for resources and utilize the communications resources. 
(2) Requests for resource allocation shall be handled based on a priority scheme 
to be established by the users of the system.4 
(3) Information about allocation of a resource shall not be available to 
unauthorized entities.   
(4) The data and programs used to make decisions about allocation shall only be 
modifiable by authorized entities. 
(5) The computer programs that are used to make the resource allocation 
decisions shall be validated that they operate correctly.  
(6) The resource allocation system shall provide audit of all transactions. 
 
4.1 Only Authorized Equipment 
This is intended to prevent unauthorized devices from accessing the system.  One 
way of implementing this is to provide a name for each device and a means of mutual 
authentication between the device and the resource-allocation entity. This would 
(hopefully) prevent misuse of the spectrum resources by our forces and the enemy from 
masquerading as a legitimate endpoint. There will also need to be a means of preventing 
                                                 
4 We recognized that a set of advanced users might, with appropriate authorization, manually flood the 
system with requests for allocation of the same or even several resources.  If advanced users are given this 
authorization, then the “fair” allocation of resources becomes a “personnel management” issue.   
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the enemy from operating captured devices. This could be implemented by rekeying all 
access points.5   
 
4.2 Resource Allocation Policy  
The intent here is that the owners of the system will provide policy that provides 
for the allocation of resources based on priority scheme.  The system should have 
programs that implement this policy.  Such policy might, for example, provide some 
users access to the resource, even if it is fully utilized, by removing users with lower 
priority.  It may reallocate resources by removing capabilities from one user and 
reallocating them to another based on, for example use of the resource.  The job of the 
resource management system is to enforce the users resource policy. 
 
4.3 Privacy of Resource Data 
The intent of this objective is to ensure that the data used to allocate resources and 
which resources are allocated to which entities are only “visible” to the resource manager 
and to authorized parties.  For example, unauthorized parties should not be able to see 
which resource is in use.  
 
4.4 Data and Program Protection 
The goal here is to ensure the integrity of both the data being used to make 
decisions and the programs that use that data for actually making and enforcing the 
decisions.  For example, we need to be able to ensure that only the correct, authorized 
programs are being run, that an unauthorized party cannot make changes to the system. 
 
4.5 Programs are Correct  
The goal of this objective is to ensure, to the level required by the resource 
owners, that the resource management system will operate correctly.  This can be 
accomplished by sound engineering practices, where appropriate, the application of 
mathematical methods to show correctness, and various forms of testing.  
  
4.6 Transactions are Audited 
We see there are two uses for the audit data.  One is to ensure that the system is 
behaving as specified by policy.  The second use is to provide resources for investigation 
of potential misuse of the system.  Enough audit data must be collected to support both of 
these uses.  Policies need to be established on the preservation of audit data and its 
integrity. 
                                                 




5. TIMELINES OF DATA, COMPUTATION, AND COMMUNICATION 
CONSIDERATIONS 
The discussion of timelines within distributed systems is concerned with 
continuity and preservation, that is, the extent to which data, computation and 
communication are consistent and continuous over time. 
In the client-server world of the Web, a computation is in fact manifested as a 
single entity over a fairly long timeline using the notion of a session. Web programmers 
using techniques such as Java Servlets actually have access to a session object - an object 
that encapsulated a computation between a specific client (client being a browser 
activation instance, or even a browser tab instance) and the server. Using the session 
object the programmer can persist the state of the computation as the client traverses 
pages; the state of user authentication being one obvious example of such persisted state. 
While a Web session captures the client-server conversation along the timeline 
segment that starts with the launch of the client and its termination, some Web users use 
settings in which the timeline is longer, namely persistence exists beyond the session. For 
example, a persistent cookie can preserve information about the user’s website-traversal 
history for a period as long as a year.  
In a cloud setting, timeline-persistence information such as the session 
information can be either stored by the client or stored in the cloud. 
Cloud-side timeline management is expected to be difficult to use in conjunction 
with load-balancing implementations, because the session overhead data makes it 
difficult to move the session from one web server to another. The load-balancing problem 
can be solved by using shared storage or by applying forced peering between each client 
and a single server in the cloud, techniques that run contrary to the goal of load-
balancing. 
Cloud-side session management has an advantage being capable to aborting a 
session when it discovers suspicious security-related information about the client, such as 
the client’s GPS data (in the case of a mobile client) indicating that the client is not where 
it is supposed to be. Also, cloud-side timeline management provides the infrastructure 
that enables fusion of data provided by a large group of users.  
Client-side session management removes load-balancing limitations discussed 
above.  
Client-side sessions use cookies and cryptographic techniques to maintain state 
without storing as much data on the cloud. However, when refreshing the client’s data 
(e.g., new Web page), the following communication must take place: (i) the cloud sends 
the current state data to the client (e.g., in the form of a cookie), (ii) the client saves the 
cookie in memory or on disk, (iii) the client sends the cookie back to the server upon its 
next request, and the server uses the data to re-incarnate its memory of the state of the 
application for that specific client, thereby generating an appropriate response (Step (i), 
again). 
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Clearly, data stored on the client poses a security risk because the mobile device 
might be lost by its user or captured by enemy forces.  Two security requirements needed 
for addressing this risk are: 
(1) Confidentiality: Nothing apart from the server should be able to interpret 
session data. 
(2) Data integrity: Nothing apart from the server should manipulate session data 
(accidentally or maliciously). 
 
6. INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS 
Interoperability has been recognized as a major issue in net-centric operations, 
and it will remain a major issue in spectrum management.  We need to address both data 
interoperability across organization boundaries of the local tactical cloud, and other 
supporting private clouds, such as the Intelligence and Maritime domain clouds, and 
data/application/virtualization interoperability across cloud providers’ actual equipment 
installed.  Ongoing DoD efforts, like the US Navy’s Consolidated Afloat Networks and 
Enterprise Services (CANES) program and the Army’s Network Integration Evaluation 
(NIE) process, are designed to streamline and update DoD tactical networks to improve 
interoperability across the fleet and services.  
A widely recognized model for system-of-systems interoperability is the Levels of 
Information System Interoperability (LISI) Maturity Model published by the Department 
of Defense (DoD) C4ISR Architecture Working Group [7].  LISI classifies the degree of 
sophistication with respect to exchanging and sharing information and services among 
systems in terms of PAID, an acronym for four closely interrelated attributes: Procedures, 
Applications, Infrastructure, and Data, where: 
(1) The procedures (P) attribute reflects the degree of interoperability resulting 
from operational policies and processes, functional program development 
guidance, as well as compliance of technical and system architecture 
standards (e.g., hardware, system software, communications, data, and 
application standards). 
(2) The application (A) attribute reflects the ability of the software applications to 
work on different systems and platforms as they progress through the 
interoperability maturity levels, ranging from stand-alone applications at the 
low end to applications that are designed for cross-discipline or cross-
organizational boundaries at the high end. 
(3) The infrastructure (I) attribute reflects the degree and form of connectivity 
between the systems and applications (e.g., point-to-point phone connection 
versus wide-area network across great variety of systems and communication 
protocols), and the way in which the systems interact with each other (e.g., 
application specific interface versus platform independent Web services). 
(4) The data (D) attribute reflects the flexibility of the data format and the 
richness of the information being exchanged across systems and domains 
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(ranging from files containing a single data type to integrated information 
space that supports all forms of data representation, presentation, and 
exploitation). 
 The LISI model focuses on system-to-system information exchanges but falls 
short in providing a basis for assessing the maturity of cloud-to-cloud interoperability 
(C2CI). In particular, security and mobility across organizational boundaries and domains 
are important attributes that need to be considered when assessing the maturity level of 
C2CI, especially from a usability and acceptability-for-use perspective. In [8], we 
extended the PAID attributes and presented a five-level maturity model for Cloud-to-
Cloud interoperability.   
 
6.1  Extension to PAID 
The procedures (P) attribute will also reflect the availability of and adherence to 
uniform security and privacy policies and procedures that can be applied consistently 
across cloud boundaries, industrial standards for SLAs, standard procedures for cloud-
services auditing, and technical and system architecture standards for cloud infrastructure 
and applications.  
The application (A) attribute will also reflect the ease of cloud-service integration, 
as well as the ability of the software applications to work and migrate seamlessly across 
cloud boundaries while maintaining the same quality-of-service (QoS) levels. 
The infrastructure (I) attribute will also reflect the degree of cloud mobility, 
availability of uniform tool sets for security (e.g., identity management), and cloud-
services provisioning, management, monitoring, reporting and auditing. 
The data (D) attribute will also reflect the degree of the evolution from an 
application-centric to a data-centric view of information processing. Instead of today’s 
artificial separation between data and applications, information in the cloud will be 
treated as artifacts, which are embodiments of data and their associated manipulators, 
mini programs that allow the user to process (e.g., view, edit, and print) the data [9]. 
Manipulators are dynamically configured and associated with an artifact, according to the 
artifact’s state, and can provide access and security control.  
 
6.2  The Five-level C2CI Model 
Since cloud computing builds on the premise that computing resources can be 
rapidly provisioned and released over the Internet, we can safely assume that, for any 
enterprise that is ready to migrate services to a cloud provider, the enterprise has 
surpassed levels 0 and 1 of the original LISI model and achieved the necessary 
networking and security maturity (e.g., protection of local area networks with firewalls 
and access control through local user authentication and file-access privileges) required 
to reach level 2.  By removing Level 0, 1 and 2 from LISI, and adding three additional 
levels based on the degree of portability/mobility, security/privacy interoperability, ease 
of integration, and the availability of standard management, monitoring and audit 
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procedures and tools, we maintain the components of LISI that are applicable to the cloud 
model while adding the appropriate levels necessary for evaluating C2CI. The proposed 
C2CI model consists of the following levels: 
(1) Level 0 – Domain-based interoperability in an integrated environment 
characterized by wide-area networks, shared data, separate applications, 
shared databases, and sophisticated collaboration. Cloud services are confined 
to single provider clouds.  
(2) Level 1 – Enterprise-based interoperability in a universal environment 
characterized by wide-area networks, shared data, shared applications, cross-
domain information sharing, and advanced collaborations via the inter-cloud 
Web services.  
(3) Level 2 – Portability interoperability in a public, private, or hybrid cloud 
environment where cloud artifacts may traverse multiple providers in down 
states.   Inter-cloud enforcement of security and privacy policies and SLA are 
based on pair wise agreements. 
(4) Level 3 – Security interoperability in a public, private, or hybrid cloud 
environment where policies and procedures from one cloud provider will 
interact with other policies and procedures with other cloud provider(s) 
transparently and automatically using standardized protocols and cloud-wide 
formal trust relationships. 
(5) Level 4 – Mobile interoperability in a public, private, or hybrid cloud 
environment where cloud artifacts may traverse multiple providers in in-flight 
states.  There is no artificial separation between data and applications.   Data 
in the cloud can be shared and manipulated by multiple applications on 
multiple platforms. 
 
6.3 Applying the C2CI Model 
At minimum, the tactical cloud needs to achieve C2CI Level 1 to support 
spectrum management.  Tactical cloud computing can rely on solutions provided by 
emerging Web 3.0 standards, semantic web technologies for service registry and 
discovery, and SOA-based implementation to solve the data interoperability problems 
across organization boundaries.  However, matured security interoperability at C2CI 
Level 3 is needed for the tactical cloud to guarantee the desired “quality of security 
service” discussed in Section 4. 
 
7. CLOUD ADOPTION AND TRANSITION CONSIDERATIONS 
To attain the full benefit of leveraging the cloud in the tactical environment, we 
must have a well laid-out plan for the transition from the current non-cloud environment 
to the future cloud-based tactical environment. The plan must spell out a smooth 
transitional path so that the tactical environment would continue to operate during the 
transition process.  In [10], we presented a cloud service-adoption process that includes 
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research to identify potential cloud services, pathfinder experiments to overcome 
impediments, and pilot studies to create policy, an architecture, and a roadmap for their 
adoption (see Figure 1).   Moreover, the process must provide the adoption teams with 
adequate decision points to drop or promote investigations of a particular cloud 
computing technology. 
 
Figure 1. Cloud Service Adoption Process 
 
8. CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS 
While the redundant nature of cloud computing is an enabler for robust, reliable 
tactical computing, the need for tactical systems to continue to operate even in the 
presence of one or more failures of cloud services necessitates new ways to architect the 
Spectrum-Management system, as demonstrated by the large-scale Amazon Web 
Services (AWS) blackout that occurred in April 2011 [11]. 
 
9. OPTIMIZATION ACROSS DIMENSIONS BEYOND SPECTRUM 
MANAGEMENT 
Spectrum management should not be considered in isolation of engineering 
considerations, such as providing for elasticity by dynamically (i.e., at runtime) allocating 
the computing tasks between mobile devices and the cloud, taking into consideration 
factors such as the device’s status, cloud’s status, and user- and application-specified 
QoS, resulting in what Zhang et al. refer to as an “execution configuration” [12].  Zhang 
et al. also developed a cost model and algorithms for use in optimizing the execution 
environment, which takes into consideration based on real-time monitoring of 
Device and cloud related data such as battery level, network conditions, 
device loads, cloud loads and other performance data including current 
latency of the application…. 
They admitted however that for applications that are composed of “multiple types of 
weblets [components of an application that can be individually launched on the device or 
in the cloud], each having different runtime behaviors, the optimization can be very 
complex and the computation itself may override the cost savings” in offline or remote 
execution of the components. 
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 In addition to the architectural framework introduced by Zhang et al., Rodriguez-
Martinez et al. [13] and Damm, Rigz, and Strauch [14] have proposed software patterns 
and archetype patterns for use in developing elastic mobile cloud applications. 
 
10. CONCLUSION 
This report presents two high-level use cases to illustrate how cloud computing 
can play a role in supporting spectrum management—an important component of tactical 
communications. It also discusses the challenges and possible approaches for making the 
cloud-based system timely, robust, trustworthy, and interoperable, as well as means to 
validate and verify such systems. 
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